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BOOK REVIEWS

was "a blunderer ... quacksalver ...
bungling sorcerer's apprentice," and
Christ "just an alibi, a man of straw."
His own adolescent denial of Jesus,
the protagonist notes, paled alongside
the deep desolation of the sanatorium
priest. Sin, for the priest, was "invented by men so they would deserve
the pain of living, so they would not
be punished without reason." Prayer,
for this cleric wrestling with belief, was
"another solitary vice." Jesus? While
trying to save dying inmates, the priest
fights the painful suspicion that "he
came to save himself, more than to save
us." God was "not just a house of peace .
. . . He's also a predator, a heavenly
hound who follows us and forces us
and loves us."
Marta embodies the central enigma
of Bufalino' s tale. She had survived the
holocaust: partisans had shorn her
hair when they caught her with a nazi.
"Every enigma has its mirror," said
Longbones, and the mirror in this case
may be the protagonist/author who
survived Marta, yet is left with a remorse greater than the relief: "I betrayed our silent agreement not to
survive."
Against the mythic blue sea of
Palermo, Marta seemed to be the pagan
"Siren, birdwoman, fishwoman, mermaid hidden under the rock." Yet she
is a jewish woman and when she died,
"the sluice-gates of God's flood truly
rumbled, sang in those soiled sheets,
and there was no dove from which salvation might come."
At the end, the protagonist/author
is left "in the middle of the path: a
squandered seed, deconsecrated substance, a fistful of earth on which the
rain falls." And with jumbled emotion:
"what sad days those were, the happiest of my life."
judeo-christianity,
In this deconsecrated
the central figure is a pagan/jewish
crucified woman and sanatorium inmates waiting to die who are incapable
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of belief. Yet "the emotionwith which we

learned of others' deaths, as if they were
our own, was itself love."
Bufalino's tale, a significant document in the history of belief in the late
twentieth century, has resonances every
where in Italy. Yet it could not have
been written by anyone but a sicilian,
and could not have been located anywhere but on that mediterranean isle.
LUCIA CHIAVOLA BIRNBAUM

Inscriptions: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism
By Hugh J. Silverman
New York and London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987
"An archeology of knowledge is a
dispersive practice" (320). This phrase
aptly defines the hermeneutical and
semiological practice of Hugh Silverman's Inscriptions. So does the following description of what constitues an
archeology of knowledge:
Instead of tracing a single idea through history, the archeologist of knowledge looks
for discontinuous formations. Each formation will have sets of rules and each grouping of sets into systems will establish the
epistemological signification which Foucault
regularly calls the episteme. (320)

This definition sums up very well
what the reader finds in this clear, perceptive and stimulating work. Husserl,
Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre,
Piaget, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, Derrida-these
are the names that make
up the groupings that inform Silverman's archeology. The aim, however,
is not the tracing of an idea through
history through an examination of disparate authors or the delineation of

BOOK REVIEWS

schools of thought that succeed one
another historically; rather, the tracing
is of two parallel yet convergent
methodologies-phenomenology
and
structuralism-to determine their spaces
of difference and intersection. "At the
limit of one, signs of the other are already plotted. At the frontier of the
other, the former is incorporated and .
advanced" (ix). In Merleau-Ponty there
are already positions and interrogations
that Derrida takes up and resolves:
"While Merleau-Ponty stands at the
opening of the place between, Derrida
formulates its closure" (xii). For this
reason the readings that set out to describe this archeology from MerleauPonty to Derrida are more properly
termed "inscriptions," that is, "essays
at opening the space of difference" (9).
They are analyses that mark the attempt
at re-inscribing itself within the tradition of continental philosophy while
re-inscribing this very same tradition
to better define its place and position.
The space of this inscription is language. It is at this point that phenomenology and structuralism, hermeneutics
and semiology, can be said to intersect.
Merleau-Ponty's meditation on Saussure's theory of language or the later
Sartre's emphasis on the written word
are examples of points of convergence
that phenomenologically inspired philosophies share in common with structuralist or post-structuralist systems. At
these points of transition, phenomenological systems interrogate their own
postulates and can be said to move toward structuralist positions. In MerleauPonty, for instance, the move in the
later works toward a conception of
"non-philosophy"
aligns it with the
"decentering of philosophy" of later
critical practice. Silverman's focus here
is on the "conceptual dissemination"
of a writer's thoughts (123), that is, the
making of a philosopher in all its manifestations or, as he puts it, "se faisant"
(123). In this fashion the re-reading of
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Merleau-Ponty underscores those transitional elements that move toward structuralist and post-structuralist positions.
In the case of Sartre, the qualitative
shifting of the relation of self and language throughout his corpus makes it
possible to speak of varying epistemes
at different stages of his work. These
are "different stages of thought in which
the relationship between language and
self forms different (but comparable)
structures" (363).
But Professor Silverman's task is not
to draw, necessarily and at all costs,
the common ground between phenomenology and structuralism or to show
how phenomenology moves toward
structuralism. The space of inscription
that he delineates is at the same time
the locus of differences that emerge
from their con-frontation. While Sartre's critique of human nature and of
self-surpassing can be cited as conceptually compatible with structuralist
claims (210), his stand on linguistics,
on the role of the unconscious or on
the concepts of synchrony and diachrony are incompatible with the views
expressed on these subjects by Saussure, Lacan and Levi-Strauss, respectively. Silverman wants to show, in
fact, that Sartre's position points to
possible limitations in the structuralist
perspective. Sartre's conception oflanguage as "signifying-consciousness object-signified relation" (217) situates
language within human experience,
making the notion of a psychoanalytic
unconscious irrelevant. As lived experience, unreflected or reflective consciousness cannot be structured as a
language, as Lacan maintains, nor can
it be formulated as a structure or a
myth, as Levi-Strauss contends. "Diachrony must prevail and synchrony
must follow .... Structural knowledge
is produced by human activity-including structuralist activity" (218). It
is this latter aspect which is determining. All things being similar between
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the two accounts, the structuralist always comes up short on the side of
human experience. "What they [the
structuralists] cannot understand is the
individual's project-this
element of
personalization stands firmly on Sartre's side" (276).
In the later essays, another key aspect of Silverman's inscriptions is developed. The confrontational analyses,
which pit the phenomenologist against
the structuralist in order to essay the
relational differences, become the
groundwork for the elaboration of
more prescriptive notions. In the chapter on Sartre and Piaget, the conceptual
tension which is described by accounting for two opposing theories of
human development gives way to a
third that contains them both. "In moving through
this confrontational
analysis, I will show the groundwork
for a theory of human development
which accounts for both the contextualist and the structuralist perspectives" (219). The term given to this
theory is "multi-contextual experiential
structuralism" (233), which means to
account for both the situation in which
an individual develops and for the
structural differences that pertain to it.
"A multi-contextual experiential structuralism brings out all three of these
aspects: biography,
situation, and
structural identities and differences"
(235).
Similarly, out of the confrontation
between Sartre and Barthes, or between two conceptions of Writing, Silverman sketches out the possibility of
a "critical practice of Writing" (253) that
would account for both the totalization
and the textualization of Writing that
they advocate:
In order to achieve such a signifying critical
and theoretical practice, it would be necessary to situate both writing and reading at
the slash, on the line, in the interface between work and text, between totalization
and textualization, between problematics
and pleasures of literature/text. (253)
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And by juxtaposing
Sartre and
Foucault, he similarly establishes the
place of History: "In this chapter (14]
I will show that the place of History is
located at the frontier between Dialectic and Episteme" (254).
Silverman's theoretical practice is
one in which theoretical approaches
(here those of Sartre and the structuralists) are juxtaposed to determine
a relationality and a difference, namely,
the boundary at the slash where these
accounts converge and differ. In so
doing it neither repeats nor proliferates
needlessly existential or structuralist
practice, not is it a synthesis of the two
or even a third practice. Rather, as a
practice that would determine the
limits of the existentialist and structuralist positions, it is offered as an alternative to these critical practices
"without end" (276).
The setting of limits as the space of
inscription of Silverman's theoretical
practice is then articulated in terms of
Derridean discourse and of self-decentering. Silverman shows first of all that
both Sartre and Heidegger can be credited with having approached the limits
of metaphysics with a conception of
self-decenteredness even though they
remain on this side of its boundaries:
"Sartre finds no center to man. In this
respect, his position is similar to that
of Heidegger. 'Difference' for Heidegger is 'nothingness' for Sartre. Both
move close to the edge of the epoch of
metaphysics"
(306). Similarly with
Foucault, whose announcement of the
nearing of the end of man ushers Derrida: "The Derridean de-centering, announced by Foucault, takes place in
grammatology" (307).
In the last chapters, Silverman develops an interpretive typology which
aims at determining the extent to
which "heterotopias"
(the multiple
places where we live) take up hypertopian or hypotopian characteristics. A
hypertopia is a deconstructed utopia
experienced in the heterotopia of the
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here and now (331), and a hypotopia
is the opposite, a de-generate form of
dystopia, that is, a degraded place that
exhibits all the shortcomings of human
places. "Here at the interface between
desirable places and undesirable ones
is the locus of social formation, meaning and structure" (332). With reference to three different types of
spaces-the
Paris Latin Quarter,
Sartre's No Exit, and a painting by Pinturicchio-Silverman
shows how these
heterotopian
discourses
can
be
analyzed in their relation to "utopian
pro-jections or dystopian de-jections"
(337). In all these cases, the deconstruction of this interpretive topology not
only opens up the understanding of
these spaces, but also deconstructs the
hypertopian/hypotopian
opposition in
order to make explicit, says Silverman,
"the text of human spatial experience
[which] is situated at the juncture between the two" (334).
The possibility of an archeology of
heterotopias leads directly to Silverman's last and perhaps most crucial
task: a hermeneutic semiology of the
self whose task will be "to establish a
direct correlation between the self as
interpreter and the system of signs produced in the interpretation" (338). It is
in this gathering of the "how" of hermeneutic interpretation and of the
"what" of semiological analysis that
the self is formed . This is because signs
are signs of an interpretive act, signs
of a presence and of an actualization
of the self's sign system which can only
be recovered through interpretation itself (345).
As Silverman points out in the Introduction, Inscriptions "is not a philosophical treatise. " This qualification
announces the distancing that distinguishes it from a traditional philosophical investigation . Inscriptionsprescribes
neither a new centering for philosophy
nor proliferates older ones . Rather, it
seeks to inscribe the space at which
philosophies intersect by defining their
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terms and their boundaries. Inscriptions
is at the same time an archeology of
knowledge, a theory of typology, a hermeneutic semiology or, simply, a
theory of textuality. In other words, it
is an important work that creates the
possibility for new areas of analysis
and requires close scrutiny from all
those who today engage in the practice
of theoretical understanding.
MASSIMO VERDICCHIO
University of Alberta-Edmonton

Mosca and the Theory

of Elitism
By Ettore A. Albertoni
Trans. by Paul Goodrick
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987

There is a tradition in political and
social theory which consists in large
measure of the study of the origin and
consequences of the following factevery politically organized society is divided into two classes: a minority of
rulers, and a majority of subjects ruled
by them. It is often labeled the elite or
elitist school, although the term elitism
is misleading by conveying an antidemocratic connotation which is not
necessarily part of the theory; further,
we do not really have a "school" in the
full-blown sense that sociologists of
knowledge deal with. An example of
an important issue discussed by elite
theorists is the question of whether and
how this class division exists in a democratic society, how elitism conceives
the difference between democratic and
undemocratic societies, what is the nature and origin of these ruling and elite
classes, whether there is any way in
which this class division could ever be
eliminated, and what is the relation-

